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Abstract
We investigate the effect of multiple flood events on property prices in Zurich canton of
Switzerland. By merging property transaction data with records from universal and mandatory
building insurance, we are able to identify the effect of the informational content of floods
separately from the damage caused. Our rich data allows us to control for a wide range of
housing characteristics, thus reducing the bias from unobserved heterogeneity that routinely
plagues hedonic regressions. We find that houses located in flood hazard zones sell at a
discount relative to houses located outside, despite the presence of mandatory insurance
that covers most (but not all) costs. Providing flood hazard information increases the value of
houses that are assigned a low risk. Last, we look at the effect of floods on property prices and
find that in the aftermath of flood events, properties that narrowly escaped damage were sold
at a significant discount relative to houses located out of harm’s way. This pure information
effect decays shortly.
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1 Introduction
Floods are among the most important natural disasters worldwide. The largest flood impacts
tend to be located in coastal areas as a result of hurricanes or tsunami events, but flooding is also
important in inland areas. About 21 million people worldwide are affected by river floods each
year. Due to climate change and socio–economic developments, the number of affected people
is predicted to increase to 54 million by 2030 as the surface temperature continues to rise (Luo et
al., 2015; Willner et al., 2018). Switzerland, which is the focus of this paper, is no exception. In
2015, the damage to private property, infrastructure, forestry and agriculture caused by floods,
debris flows, landslides and rock falls amounted to CHF 135 million, 92 percent of which resulted
from floods (Hilker et al., 2009).1
Flood damages depend on the affected housing stock. For this reason, it is important that
flood risk be reflected in current and future housing development, for example in the form of
building restrictions or insurance mandates, but also in market prices. In this paper, we examine
the effect of flood events on housing prices in Switzerland. Our data allow us to control for a wide
range of housing characteristics, predicted flood risk and actual damages due to river floods in
the years 2007–2019 in the canton of Zurich. We find that flood events cause a drop in the price
of (spared) houses located in the proximity of damaged houses, relative to comparable houses
located further away. This implies that flood events contain information that causes home buyers
to update their expectations about flood risk.
A number of previous hedonic pricing studies estimated the effect of sea floods on housing
values. Table A.1 in the Appendix presents a comprehensive overview of the related literature.
Most of the studies focus on the USA that impose mandatory flood insurance via the National
Flood Insurance Program for properties located in a 100–year floodplain.2 A recent meta-analysis
by Beltrán et al. (2018b) finds an average price discount of 4.6% for houses located in an inland
100–year floodplain, which increases to 6.9% in the aftermath of a flood. The situation in Switzer-
land differs from the US context as home owners are required by law to buy a flat-rate building
insurance, which covers the full (estimated) monetary damages caused by flooding at a price
that does not depend on the risk of flooding associated with the location of the building. As
1 The Swiss Franc, or CHF, is currently at par with the US dollar.
2 For a survey of the older literature, see Boyle and Kiel (2001). Examples of more recent studies are Daniel et al.
(2009), Atreya and Ferreira (2015) and Bakkensen and Barrage (2017).
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a result, homeowners in safe areas cross-subsidize houses located in risky areas, for example
near rivers or in the mountains. This socialized insurance should, in principle, remove any price
differentials due to flood risk with the exception of uninsurable costs such as the possibility of
death, injury or being displaced, damage to municipality infrastructure, transactions costs or the
loss of personal items with sentimental value. This makes it more difficult to identify a risk-related
price differential in the Swiss real estate market. On the other hand, the presence of a socialized
insurance scheme means that we have accurate information about flood damages (via insurance
claims) and that there is no unobserved price component due to insurance fees (as the price is the
same for everyone). Despite the insurance scheme, we find a price discount for houses located in
flood-prone areas. This discount is temporary in nature and occurs in the aftermath of floods.
Most hedonic price models of flood risk estimate the price differential between houses based
on cross-sectional variation.3 However, the identification of the flood risk-component in such a
setting may suffer from omitted variable bias and from measurement error bias, because flood
risk tends to be imprecisely measured. The first contribution of our paper lies in improving the
estimate of the risk differential by including additional information about transacted houses
that are typically not available in most data sets. Furthermore, we use detailed hazard maps as
our ex-ante measure of risk. These maps assign flood risk to individual properties and should
thus reduce the measurement error problem that has plagued previous studies. Controlling for
attributes and flood risk zone, we find no stable flood risk differential in housing prices.
Another way to identify the impact of floor risk on property prices is the use of a Difference-
in-Difference (DiD) spatial hedonic model framework to exploit an exogenous variation in risk at
a given location.4 Most of the previous DiD studies use flood zones to estimate price differentials
for floodplain location before and after a flood (as the ex-ante risk of flooding usually does not
change discretely). The treatment group typically consists of houses located within a particular
floodplain, whereas the respective control group is located outside (see, e.g., Bin and Polasky,
2004; Daniel et al., 2007; Atreya and Ferreira, 2012; Bin and Landry, 2013; Atreya et al., 2013a; Hill,
2015). This design avoids the omitted variable bias, but the interpretation of the DiD-effect is not
3 See for example Barnard (1978); Skantz and Strickland (1987); Shilling et al. (1989); MacDonald et al. (1990); Fridgen
et al. (1999); Shultz and Fridgen (2001); Morgan (2007)
4 An example is Davis (2004), who focuses on house prices in a county where residents had recently experienced a
severe increase in pediatric leukemia. Housing prices are compared before and after the increase with a nearby
county acting as a control group. Billings and Schnepel (2017) estimate the benefits of lead-paint remediation on
housing prices adopting a DiD estimator that compares values among remediated properties with those for which
an inspection does not identify a lead paint hazard.
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obvious as it could be caused by at least three mechanisms: First, the price decrease (if any) could
be due to the flood damage itself, provided that damages are sufficiently widespread (Atreya and
Ferreira, 2015). Second, insurance premia could increase for houses located in the flood zone
due to a permanent upward adjustment of the expected flood risk by the insurance provider. And
third, home buyers could adjust their expectations about flood risk if a flood event increases the
salience of a risk (Hallstrom and Smith, 2005; Kellens et al., 2013; Burningham et al., 2008). For
example, price effects in the US disappeared around six years after Hurricane Floyd (Bin and
Landry, 2013) and eight to nine years after the flood of 1994 in Georgia (Atreya et al., 2013b).5
Without additional information about insurance premia and actual damages, these channels
cannot be distinguished from each other. Given our context of socialized building insurance,
however, we can rule out any changes in insurance premia. Furthermore, the universal coverage
leads to complete claims information on all houses. This allows us to identify the properties that
were damaged by the flood and differentiate them from houses that were merely at risk. Our
DiD estimator of “near–miss” events on prices of non-damaged properties in close proximity to
recorded damages relative to prices of properties located further away thus identifies the pure
effect of informational updating in the wake of a flood. This is the second contribution of our
paper. To our knowledge, there exist no previous studies that separately identify actual damages
from informational updating as a consequence of flood events. Some previous papers have used
information about the geographic extent of the flood to proxy for unobserved damages. Atreya
and Ferreira (2015), Beltrán et al. (2019) and Beltrán et al. (2018a) compare properties that were
actually flooded with nearby properties located outside of the region of inundation. Whereas
information on actual flooding is clearly a better proxy for damages than relying on hazard zones
alone, it is still imperfect as a property may be flooded yet escape actual damage due to protective
measures (e.g., stilts or flood walls).
Last, information about flood risk is a relatively recent phenomenon. Our third contribu-
tion consists in estimating the effect of introducing flood risk information and legally binding
preventive measures for houses located in risk-prone areas. The first hydrological hazard maps
were introduced in 1997, and coverage was gradually expanded throughout the canton thereafter.
5 Bakkensen and Barrage (2017) find that around 40% of households substantially underestimate coastal flood
risks. Bubeck et al. (2012) report that many individuals have no willingness-to-pay for insurance because they
underestimate the (low) probability of flood risk, and that the demand for flood insurance is determined to an
important degree by emotional fear. Risk mis-perception can result in spiking insurance take-up after a flood
(Gallagher, 2014).
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The introduction of a flood risk map provides new information that was previously not available,
or only at high transactions costs. Moreover, the risk maps were strictly informational in the
beginning but later became a binding component for each property transaction.
Our sample consists of house transactions in the canton of Zurich in the period 2007–2019.
Using geographic information software, we match the data with insurance claims, hazard maps
and a rich set of additional control variables. First, we analyze the effect of public risk information
via hazard maps and examine whether there is a stable price differential as a function of ex–ante
flood risk. To reduce the bias due to unobserved variables, we include standard amenities about
the building (year of build, surface area, nr. of rooms) and additional information such as the
positive amenity of living close to water (i.e., the distance of properties to water such as rivers
or lakes), hours of sun per day, distance to the woods and to downtown Zurich and local tax
multipliers, all of which turn out to be significant predictors for housing prices in Zurich canton.6
Next, we run two sets of DiD event study regressions. In the first approach, we define our treatment
group as houses located in areas that are subject to flood risk, whereas properties outside of these
zones serve as the control group. In the second specification, the treatment group consists of
houses located in close proximity to an actual flood damage, whereas properties located further
away serve as the control group. To cleanly separate the treated and nontreated properties and
thus mitigate a potential violation of the stable unit value treatment assumption (SUTVA), we
define a buffer zone of varying radius.
We find that being located in a flood-prone zone has a significant and negative effect on
housing prices. In the first specification using hazard zones as the treatment category, the DiD
estimates show a significant and negative effect shortly after a flood occurs. However, as only 10%
of the actually damaged houses are located in hazard zones, causality cannot be claimed as the
separation into treatment and control group is imperfect (in other words, some of the houses in
the control group were affected by the treatment as well).
Our preferred approach is the second specification, where we find a negative effect on values
of near–miss housing properties relative to houses not located near the flood. This effect is
statistically significant and strongest around 1 months after the flood and the effect disappears
after a few months. Results are robust to the use of different specifications. Our results imply an
6 We cannot control for unobserved amenities by using a fixed-effects regressions because most properties were only
sold once during our sample period.
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informational effect and that home buyers “forget” over time, which has been referred to as an
“availability bias” Tversky and Kahneman (1973).
Last, we find that the introduction of hazard maps has a differential effect on house prices
depending on the hazard location. Safe houses experience an increasing value, whereas houses
at risk are not affected. Our results highlight the value of better flood hazard information and can
help guide decision makers when assessing communal benefits gained through flood control and
mitigation projects.
The next section provides some more background information and section 3 presents our
theoretical model and the econometric specification. Section 4 presents the data and section 5
the results. The last section offers concluding remarks.
Should we stress that we use numerous fixed effects? In addition, higher and lower Near-miss
results are only interpretable for the 500 m specification; if we keep it this way, we have to incor-
porate it in the intro. Intro ist auch noch nicht ueberzeugend genug; muessen das mehr auf den
Punkt bringen...
2 Background
The canton of Zurich, see figure 1, contains 168 political municipalities and is characterized by
its capital Zurich and its agglomeration, which occupies most of the canton. The largest body
of water is the elongated Lake Zurich, and the major rivers are Limmat, Sihl, Rhine, Glatt, Toess
and Thur.7 We concentrate on the real estate market in the canton of Zurich, which is one of
the most important flood risk areas in terms of damages in Switzerland due to its (relatively)
large population of close to 1.5 million and the industrial concentration (Tages-Anzeiger, 2012).
Between 2007 - 2019, major floods always occurred between April and August.8
The real estate market in Switzerland is mostly dominated by locals. Most real estate buyers
live in Switzerland as the sale of property to foreigners is restricted and cantonal authorization is
needed before gaining title.9 In Switzerland, buyers and sellers first agree on the price. Afterwards,
financing by banks has to be secured and a property transfer has to be made official which means
7 Greifensee and Pfaeffikersee are two other major lakes in the canton and there are various of smaller lakes.
8 The biggest floods in terms of estimated, caused damages and number of insurance claims are the floods of August
8-9, 2007; June 7, 2015 and May 30, 2018, see section 4.2.
9 Only EU or EFTA national with a Swiss residence permit residing in Switzerland or individuals with a Swiss C permit
can acquire property.
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Figure 1: Overview of the Canton of Zurich. Notes: Map of the canton with the main cities Zurich
& Winterthur. Map sources: SWISSTOPO (background map, reproduced by permission of
SWISSTOPO).
buying offers are held in escrow by a notary where they are signed by both parties. Only then, a
property changes ownership, i.e. the date of contract is always prior to the transaction date. On
average, the period between price determination and change in ownership is around one to three
months.10
Very special about Switzerland is its unique social insurance. All buildings in the canton
with a value > 5,000 CHF have to be insured at the GVZ11. Elementary damage by flooding as
a result of rainfall (if water penetrates the building on the surface), avalanches, snow pressure
and snowfall as well as rock fall and landslide are insured. The insurance is social, which means
that everyone pays the same price per building value independent of structural risk.12 Buildings
are socially insured with the structure, the structural cover, the installations and the interior
construction. In case of a damage, the GVZ covers the cost of immediate and emergency measures
and compensates for the effective demolition, clearing and disposal cost. The deductible is CHF
500 (GVZ, 2017).
In theory, every Swiss homeowner should be informed about possible flood risk at the place
of residence. Detailed flood maps in Switzerland (figure 2) indicate the precise location of each
10We spoke with different real estate agencies to obtain this approximate time window.
11GVZ stands for Gebäudeversicherung Zürich, which is German for building insurance of Zurich.
12In 2017, the insurance premium was CHF 0.32 cents (about USD 0.34) for every CHF 1,000 of the insurance value,
which is an estimate of the cost to rebuild the house.
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property and they are online available to residents (see http://maps.zh.ch). The hazard map
Figure 2: Online available hazard maps. Notes: The figure shows a map section of Zurich’s hazard
zones. Source: http://maps.zh.ch.
classifies an examined area with respect to the magnitude and frequency of potential flood events
(Fuchs et al., 2017). The main criteria for classification of the hazard is the flood intensity13 and
new real estate owners are pointed towards them during the purchasing process. Three main
hazard risk classes and related building restrictions exist (Canton of Zurich, 2014a):
13The flood intensity with thresholds at 0.5 m or 0.5 m 2/s (yellow and blue), between 0.5 m and 2.0 m or 0.5m 2/s
and 2.0m 2/s (yellow and blue), or exceeding 2.0 m or 2.0 m 2/s (red) is used. The probability of occurrence of the
underlying flood hazard is used to further distinguish hazard zones for up to 30 year (blue and red), 30-100 year
(yellow, blue and red) and 100 to 300 year (yellow and red) return periods.
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Red zones (high hazard): Residents at risk inside and outside of buildings; sudden
destruction of a building is possible; any construction of
new houses is restricted 14
Blue zones (medium hazard): Residents at risk outside of buildings; moderate destruc-
tion of buildings may be possible. New houses only per-
mitted to be constructed if owner guarantees to imple-
ment protection measures. Existing houses have to be
adapted in case of modification or extension.
Yellow zones (low hazard): Flood hazard may lead to considerable monetary loss at
buildings, but people are rarely at risk; construction of
critical buildings, e.g. schools and public buildings is only
allowed after a specific sensitivity analysis. Private owners
have to declare that they are well aware of the potential
risk; protective measures are voluntary.15
Hazard maps have not always existed. Only since 1997, flood hazard maps are implemented
continuously by the municipalities and by the canton.16 Once the hazard map has been elaborated
and delivered to the municipality (further referred to as “mapintro”), the information of the hazard
zones are known and municipalities are required to alert owners in the vulnerable areas to the
potential hazards, immediately after the hazard map has been established. But several months up
to a few year can pass from the delivery of the maps (i.e. mapintro) to the official implementation (
further referred to as “compliance”). Homeowners do have to comply legally with the zone-specific
requirements at the official implementation date.
Hazard maps do indeed come into play when evaluating real estate. The “Züricher Kantonal-
bank”, for example, takes into account any additional costs for protective measures and loss of
value due to restricted buildability, when evaluation real estate. In the case of existing properties,
it is also checked whether the buildings comply with the regulations and permits.
16The guidelines for the consideration of the hydrological hazards in land–use planning activities were approved in
1997 (BWW, BRP, and BUWAL, 1997). The municipalities must take into account the requirements of protection
against natural hazards in the context of land use planning, revisions of the building and zoning regulations as well
as design and district plans. This spatial planning implementation must be integrated into the running processes
immediately after the hazard map has been defined, in order to avoid creating new risks in areas at risk (Canton of
Zurich Construction Department, 2016).
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3 Theory
We use an illustrative hedonic model adapted to the Zurich real estate market to establish the
main hypotheses and to guide our empirical strategy, which we introduce in turn.
3.1 Hedonic pricing model
Our hedonic pricing model builds on Bin et al. (2008a). Households are perfectly rational and well
informed, both when buying and selling houses.17 We utilize a hedonic price function (Rosen,
1974), which can be represented as:
P = P (s , n (t ), r ) (1)
The price P is a function of structural characteristics s , such as the number of rooms or the age of
the house, but also location-specific characteristics such as the commuting distance to the next
main city using the existing rail and road network, the view, proximity to recreational facilities
and the number of sunlight hours.18 It also depends on municipality–specific public goods n (t )
and the flood risk r . The public goods are financed by linear municipality taxes t such that
∂ n (t )
∂ t > 0. The function P (·) is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable in all arguments
and will produce an estimate of the representative household’s marginal willingness to pay for an
additional unit of an attribute.
Households’ utility is strictly concave in all arguments and given by:
U (s , n (t ), c ) , (2)
with c representing a composite commodity that serves as the numeraire. Consumers are in-
formed about the location-specific flood risk r via the presence of hazard maps, (see figure 2).
These are publicly available and have to be acknowledged and singed by the buyer.
We use an expected utility framework in which consumers account for the risk information in
their decision making. The observed discount on property prices in an area with high flood risk,
17See Pope (2008) for a critical discussion about this assumption.
18This variable captures the share of the day during which the sun is blocked by nearby mountains and hills. It could
therefore also be described as an absence of shade.
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relative to safe areas (but all else equal), thus reflects household’s willingness to pay to avoid such
risk.
The consumer maximizes expected utility over two states of the world. With a probability of
p , a flood–related damage occurs over a given period of time, whereas with a probability of 1−p
there is no damage. There exists insurance for the structure of the house and home owners have
to pay a deductible. But floods can also cause monetary and non-monetary losses which are not
covered by insurance such as personal injury, hassle of being displaced by flood damage, damage
to municipality infrastructure, the effort to contact insurance, destruction of items excluded
from insurance (such as damages to garden structures or vegetation) and loss of personal items
with sentimental value. The parameter m L represents the expected income in the loss state, i.e.,
income remaining for consumption of the numeraire, including any insurance settlement net of
insurance payments, deductibles and uninsured losses, and m N L represents expected income in
the no-loss state, with m L <m N L .
The expected utility can thus be written as
E [U ] =p (r ) ·U L [s , n (t ), m L −λ ·P (s , n (t ), r )− t ] (3)
+ (1−p (r )) ·U N L [s , n (t ), m N L −λ ·P (s , n (t ), r )− t ]
where p (r ) is the subjective probability of a flood event (based on available hazard maps) and
the utility function is state dependent across loss (L) and no-loss (N L). λ is a parameter which
converts the sales price to a per-period price.19 Consumers take the hedonic price schedule P (·) as
given and residual income is spent on consumption of the numeraire good. Taking the derivative
with respect to housing characteristic s , the optimality condition is given by
∂ P
∂ s
=
p (r ) ∂U
L
∂ s + (1−p (r ))
∂U N L
∂ s
λ · [p (r ) ∂U L∂ c + (1−p (r ))
∂U N L
∂ c ]
, (4)
which is positive if s is a desirable amenity, and negative otherwise. This states that the marginal
“implicit hedonic price” for amenity s is equal to the ratio of the expected amenity value and the
expected marginal utility of income.
19This period could be any number of years. Since the same period applies for both states of the world, neither the
length of the period nor the discount factor are relevant.
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The price for housing is also influenced by local tax rates. The optimality condition for t is
∂ P
∂ t
=
p (r )[ ∂U
L
∂ n
∂ n (t )
∂ t −
∂U L
∂ c ] + (1−p (r ))[
∂U N L
∂ n
∂ n (t )
∂ t −
∂U N L
∂ c ]
λ · [p (r ) ∂U L∂ c + (1−p (r ))
∂U N L
∂ c ]
(5)
where we have applied ∂U
L ,N L
∂ c
∂ P
∂ n (t )
∂ n (t )
∂ t =
∂U L ,N L
∂ c
∂ P
∂ t . If the marginal utility of income exceeds the
marginal utility of a tax increase financing the municipality–public good, i.e., ∂U
L
∂ c >
∂U L
∂ n
∂ n (t )
∂ t , a
tax increase has a negative effect on housing prices, and vice versa.
Hypothesis 1 (H1) is motivated by the marginal effect of (exogenous) risk on housing prices,
which is given by
∂ P
∂ r
=
∂ p (r )
∂ r (U
L −U N L )
λ · [p (r ) ∂U L∂m + (1−p (r ))
∂U N L
∂m ]
< 0. (6)
The marginal price for risk is equal to the difference in utility by the two states, weighted by
the marginal probability of risk ∂ p (r )∂ r (U
L −U N L ) and divided by the expected marginal utility of
income. As m L <m N L such that U L >U N L , an increase in flood risk will have a negative price
effect, which constitutes H1. A finding of no price differential between risky and safe zones could
be due to a small difference between U L and U N L , which is the case if the uninsurable costs are
small, or if consumers underestimating flood risk at the time when they purchase a house.
In the absence of shocks, buyers can potentially become insensitive to environmental risk
factors, especially in the presence of socialized insurance that is insensitive to the actual risk.
Furthermore, without any risk information, e.g. in form of hazard maps, homeowners do not
have any prior knowledge about their potential flood risk. We know the specific date when home
owners learn their respective flood risk once the hazard maps are implemented (mapintro) and
the specific date, once compliance with the maps is binding. There are two possibilities, in which
direction a price adjustment can take place once information is available. If home owners learn
about a risk increase, we expect a negative effect on housing value, see equation (6). However, if
the safe location of a house is officially confirmed, we expect a positive effect. This establishes
our second hypothesis (H2). We also investigate whether there is a difference between the pure
information about the hazard zone (mapintro) and the associated future protective measures that
must be taken and the binding, legal obligation which comes once the hazard map is established,
that is only binding later (compliance).
The occurrence of a flood may lead to a revision of expectations based on hazard maps, as new
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information is available. If this information was available before, but simply forgotten, then this is
called an availability bias. Since an availability bias has been shown in previous studies Gallagher
(2014), our third hypothesis (H3) states that the price differential should become larger in the
aftermath of a flood. Should we say more about the direction of the effect positive or negative. In
addition, this is only one interpretation. TBD how we should motivate this? Availability bias or
“seeing is believing”? - see results
Finally, note that if the uninsurable costs are simply too small to matter empirically, then we
should see no effect after a flood or the introduction of hazard maps.
3.2 Empirical strategy
We introduce our empirical framework and identification strategy to investigate our hypotheses.
In a first step, we estimate a baseline hedonic price regression to learn if flood risk has a negative
price effect (H1). The equation takes the following form:
l n (Pi j d ) =β0+β1l n (Si ) +β2l n (Tj d ) +β3ha z a r di +ζ j +θd+µd+ηd+εi j d (7)
The dependent variable is the (log) price per square meter of the sold property (footprint) i in
zip code area j on date d .20 The independent variables are the following. The dummy variable
ha z a r di indicates whether the property is located in a flood hazard zone (low or medium). The
vector S ki includes different structural characteristics such as the number of rooms, the actual
surface area of the house (allowing for the possibility that the price increases non-linearly), the
defined building zone, the house’s age and the calculated location–specific property attributes,
see below. We also include a dummy to indicate a damage based on insurance claims informa-
tion. We furthermore control for municipality taxes Tj d . To control for regional unobservable
characteristics that may determine housing prices, we include a set of zip code dummies ζ j . We
further include weekday fixed effects θd and month fixed effects µd to control for weekday and
month - specific seasonality. The term θd contains year fixed effects.
The standard errors are clustered on the municipality level, which can include several zip
20Our data include all property transactions during our time frame. We do not have a panel, as only few properties
were sold more than once during our sample period, and any number of sales (including zero) can occur on a
particular d . To control for unobserved heterogeneity, we include regional and time dummies.
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codes.21
I decide at this point that we are not using the “dynamic” hazard zones. i do not speak about
them neither.
Our second hypothesis addresses the introduction of hazard maps (mapintro and compliance)
and the effect on house prices. We estimate the following regression:
l n (Pi j d ) =β0+β1l n (Si ) +β2l n (Tj d ) +β3ha z a r di +β4 ·d a t ed j+ (8)
α · (ha z a r di ×d a t ed j ) +ζ j +θd+µd+ηd+εi j d
We run two versions of equation 8. In the first version, the variable dated j specifies the data
when the hazard maps were delivered to the municipalities and the hazard zone information
was communicated to the homeowner (mapintro). In the second version dated j is equal to the
compliance date since guidelines for the hazard maps became binding. We interact this date with
the low, medium and no hazard zone to learn if the effect differs between hazard zones.
To identify the information effect (H3), we obtain insurance claims and match them with the
transaction prices (for details, see section 4) in order to use two different approaches to separate
treated from control units. In the first estimation, we follow the previous literature and define the
treatment group as those properties that are located in flood-prone areas defined by the hazard
maps, whereas the control group consists of properties located outside of flood hazard zones. In
our second approach, we compare the prices for Near–miss properties (treatment group) and
prices of all other properties further away, which are unaffected by flooding (control group) after
the major floods. This methodology is similar to Beltrán et al. (2018a), but we use actual damages
to identify the treatment rather than the zip code specific inundated locations as in that study.
In addition, to separate treatment and control group more precisely, we include a spacial buffer,
see section 4.2 for more details. If informational updating takes place as home owners might
underestimate flood risk, being a Near–miss after the occurrence of a flood should lead owners to
update their subjective probability of future flooding.
21All relevant local decisions are taken on the municipality level. We use zip code dummies to capture neighborhood
effects and thus to allow for more and less desirable regions within a municipality. The zip code level is the lowest
level of regional differentiation in Switzerland, as there is no equivalent to the “census tract” used in the USA.
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We use the following DiD event study design to estimate the effect of flood events on prices:
l n (Pi j d ) =β0+β1l n (Si ) +β2l n (Tj d ) +β3t r e a ti +β4 · f l o o d td+ (9)
α · (t r e a ti × f l o o d td ) +ηd×ζ j +θd+µd+εi j d .
Here, the dummy f l o o d dt takes the value of one if date d is within t months of a flood event
(see below), and zero otherwise. The variable t r e a ti is either the Near–miss group or the hazard
group. The coefficient α on the DiD-term (t r e a ti × f l o o d dt ) is the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATET).22
To elaborate on the time profile of the flood effects, we pool all flood events and construct a
series of t flood dummies f l o o d td , which take the value of 1 if the sale date d is within t months
after a flood event. Figure 3 provides an example of the construction of these dummies for the
years 2007 to 2009. Each flood dummy is specified to measure the effect within t months before
or after the flood event. For example, f l o o d 2d = 1 on all dates for sale dates that occur 31-60
days after the flood event, whereas f l o o d 3d = 1 for sale dates that occur 61–90 days after the
flood event. To limit the effect window to a finite number of leads and lags, we are binning the
endpoints of the window.23
Should we say something here about the reference category (different for graphs and table) or
are we explicit in the results only?
To obtain unbiased estimates, we need the usual assumptions of common or parallel trends,
unconfounded assignment to treatment and stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA).
Adding the additional covariates in the regression, we assume that the control group serves
as an appropriate counterfactual for calibrating flood risk premiums in property prices over
time. This is true if any confounding omitted variables affect both treatment and control groups
22 Following Wooldridge (2010), we can define ȳh1 as the sample average of the treatment (=hazard /NM) group
before a flood (period 1) and ȳh2 after the flood. ȳc 1 is the sample average of the control group in state period and
ȳc 2 after the flood. The ATET is given by:
α= ( ȳh2|Xh2 − ȳh1|Xh1 )− ( ȳc 2|Xc 2 − ȳc 1|Xc 1 )
Hence, we compare the time change in means for treatment and control group. This framework allows us to
isolate the effect from the flood from other contemporaneous characteristics (e.g. local housing market changes,
macroeconomic shocks). In order to reduce the bias potentially introduced by observable differences across groups,
we condition on observable covariates X = (S , T ) as discussed in the text.
23The implementation of an event study design (implicitly) assumes that there is no effect after e.g. 8 months, treating
observations outside this range as control group like the observations at the flood event. This strong assumption
could be avoided by so-called binning of the endpoints, see Schmidheiny and Siegloch (2019).
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Figure 3: Flood dummies and identification of flood effect. Notes: The dummies are used in
equation (9). The time window 2007 - 2008 is used as an example and we illustrate the the use of
the flood dummies and month–year FE. Month–year FE will be used as a robustness check.
similarly. Figure 5 and 6a show the raw data with approximately similar trends over time, but it is
important to note that this period includes several floods and is therefore not “pre-treatment”.24
This can further be tested indirectly by carrying out placebo tests using previous periods which
we do by showing the event study coefficients “before” the actual floods.
An unbiased estimation of the ATET requires that the floods are not systematically related to
unobservable price determinants that end up in the error term εi t . We follow Gallagher (2014)
and argue that, conditional on a municipality’s geography and time trends, whether or not a
municipality is flooded in a particular year is random and households do not anticipate the
specific timing of the event. In this sense, the assignment to the treatment is unconfounded.
For SUTVA to hold, it must be the case that the treatment does not affect the control units.
Taken at face value, this is unlikely to hold within the Zurich real estate market. If some properties
become less desirable due to a change in the risk assessment, it is of course possible that safe
locations experience an increase in demand. This would lead to a negative correlation of the
flood-related effect on the treatment and the control group, and thus to an over–estimate of
the effect. Although we cannot rule out this bias, we argue that the share of properties at risk
relative to safe locations is sufficiently small such as to dilute the potentially price-increasing
effect of a flood on the control group. For our Near–miss specification, we furthermore include a
spacial buffer to differentiate the control and treatment group more precisely, which improves
our argument for SUTVA to hold, see section 4.2.
24This applies even to the days before the first flood event in the sample, as there were previous floods that occurred
previous to our sample period.
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4 Data
In this section, we describe our main data: Insurance claims, hazard maps, property prices and
location–specific property attributes.
4.1 House prices
We use GIS data on house prices for 2007–2019 provided by the Canton of Zurich Statistical Office
(2019b). The data contains information about the number of rooms, sales year, municipality, age
of the building, the building zone and the transaction certification date on a daily base. Defined
building zones are single family houses zone, business, mixed zone, remaining municipality
district, wood, farming zone, reserve zone, public zone, no-building zone, multiple family houses
zone. The location is given in the form of a point (x/y coordinates). We convert the nominal prices
to real prices using the CPI provided by the Federal Statistical Office (2019). We correct for outliers
by excluding the bottom and top 5 % of transactions.
4.2 Insurance data and flood events
The GVZ insurance company has a monopoly on the insurance of losses to the structure of
buildings in the canton of Zurich. Due to the mandatory nature of building insurance, the entire
housing stock of Zurich canton is insured by GVZ. We obtained confidential, geo-referenced
damage data from the GVZ that includes all claims made between 2006–2019, which are related to
flooding (GVZ, 2019). The data is anonymous in the sense that no names or addresses are revealed,
only the geographical coordinates in the form of a point.25 To be precise, the data contain the
location, the date and a variable specifying the severity of the damage, i.e. whether the claim is a
loss above the median. The average claim between 2006 – 2019 values 10,586.40 CHF, see table
A.3 for more details.
To obtain information about the economic severity of flood events between 2007âĂŞ2019, we
rely on the Swiss flood and landslide damage database managed by the Swiss Federal Institute for
Fores, Snow and Landscape Research WSL (for more information, see Hilker et al. (2009)26 Table 1
25To protect the identity and valuation of individual properties, detailed data on monetary losses are confidential
and not available to us, only a dummy indicating whether a claim was filed and paid out and if the claim was above
the median.
26Total damage cost= total property damages+ total damage to infrastructure+ total damage to forest+ total damage
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lists the main flood events during out sample period with approximated economic damages, the
number of insurance claims and the number of paid claims.
Table 1: Main floods in the canton of Zurich 2007 - 2019
Flood Date Diff. in weeks Diff. in months Damage WSL
[Mio. CHF]
No. of all GVZ
Claims
No. of paid GVZ
Claims
21.06.2007 6.4 690 264
08.08.2007 6.9 1.7 10.1 1141 210
10.06.2008 43.9 11.0 1.8 512 297
10.07.2010 108.6 27.1 0.1 324 106
27.07.2011 54.6 13.6 1.9 225 168
01.07.2012 48.6 12.1 0.6 446 119
02.05.2013 43.6 10.9 5.7 726 430
12.07.2014 62.3 15.6 1.1 314 137
07.06.2015 47.1 11.8 8.4 599 386
30.05.2018 155.4 38.9 26.6 1378 1167
Notes: The table presents the main floods in the canton of Zurichthe difference between the
floods (weeks and months) and the number of approximated damages from Hilker et al. (2009)
combined with damage data from GVZ (2019).
We see that the biggest floods are by far the 8th of August flood 2007 and the 30th May Flood
2018 with over > 1100 claims. All main floods occured between May and August. We use the 10
biggest floods from table 1 to construct our f l o o d td dummy variables as described above (see
figure 3). This means in turn that there is an overlap for the effect of the two flood 2007 which enter
the flood dummies as we are carrying out a pooled event study. The shortest interval between two
floods (except for 2007), which do not directly follow each other, is around 11 months. Therefore,
we only consider the time window of -2 – +9 months in our pooled event study.
To identify damaged houses, Near–misses as well as Non–Near–misses, we match the property
transactions with the dates and locations of the flood loss claims. Each house has a unique GVZ
insurance number which is provided by Canton of Zurich Statistical Office (2019b) as well as
by the GVZ (2019). This allows us to identify actual damaged houses very precisely. In a next
step, we compute the Euclidean distance between each house and the damaged houses using
the coordinates. Next, we need to separate the non–damaged properties into those that narrowly
missed a flood damage (Near–misses), and those that were located at a safe distance (Non–Near–
misses). There is a trade–off between sample size and accuracy when defining the radius of
the Near–miss specification. As the radius is increased, the number of treated observations
to agriculture. The damages provided by Hilker et al. (2009) are estimate aggregate damages based on newspaper
reports and the amounts of damage are as such incomplete.
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increases too, but we add an increasing number of houses that were not particularly close to
the damage and therefore did not receive the “treatment”. This dilutes the treatment effect as
more unaffected properties are lumped together with the treated ones, and is similar in spirit
to a classical measurement error. On the other hand, choosing a radius that is too narrow has
two different costs: First, the number of observations decreases quickly. For example setting the
radius at 100m leads to 462 observations, in which only 20 would be in the treatment group, for
example after two–three months. Second, and perhaps more importantly, some home buyers
may consider a distance of, say, 250 m from a damage a “near-miss” event. By classifying this as
a control unit, we violate SUTVA (the control group is affected by the treatment). To gain more
intuition about these effects, we start by specifying a distance of 50- <400 m as a Near–miss (i.e.,
no closer than 50 m but no further than 400 m from a recorded damage), whereas the control
properties are defined to be > 700m away and not damaged. This means we include a buffer of
a bandwidth of 300m. Precisely, we define near-miss as 50–500 m away, but the control houses
are at least more than 700 m away from the damage. The houses located between >400 and
<700 are excluded from the analysis, as it is not clear whether they belong to the treatment or the
control group. This reduces the number of observations, but likely improves our argument for
SUTVA to hold. Figure 5 confirms that the average yearly house and land prices differentiated by
Near–misses (400m) and non–near-misses follow roughly a similar trend.
4.3 Hazard maps
We obtain the hazard maps from the Canton of Zurich Statistical Office (2019a). Their geographic
scale varies between 1:2,000 and 1:10,000. Using consistent GIS data, we attribute the hazard
zones to houses by georeferenced overlay (Fuchs et al., 2015; Röthlisberger et al., 2017). The
houses are represented spatially by a point while the hazard zones are represented by polygons.
Thus, the attribution of the hazard category to the houses can be done in two ways. The first
is a direct attribution by the location of the point. This could underestimate the number of
exposed buildings in the neighborhood of the hazard zones, especially for large buildings. Thus
we attribute the hazard zone to an auxiliary data set of the building footprints (Röthlisberger et al.,
2018), and consequently use these categorized building footprints to attribute the hazard zone
to the house represented by a point. The building footprint polygon thus act as a bridge for the
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Figure 4: House price development by Near–miss 400m and non-Near–misses
Figure 5: Average house price development from 2007 - 2019. The solid lines are fitted using
kernel-weighted local polynomial regression, using a Gaussian kernel, a polynomial of degree
three, and a bandwidth of four quarters.
information attribution (Zischg et al., 2013). In the latter approach, the situation in which a house
is located with one edge in a flood zone but the centroid is located outside, is considered. We use
the latter approach in the main analysis.
In our analysis, we construct two versions of hazard dummies. First, we compute a categorical
variable, which differentiates between medium, low and no hazard zones. Since the treatment
group sample size would be to small to estimate a DiD, we further combine the blue and yellow
hazard zones and constructs an additional hazard dummy that is equal to one if a property is
located in a hazard zone (of any color), and zero otherwise.27
Several months up to a few year can pass from the delivery of the maps (i.e. the “mapintro”) to
the official implementation (“compliance”). We attributed both dates to our data set. The dates
of elaboration and implementation were collected from the cantonal authorities in Switzerland
(Bruchez, 2017). We construct the variables ma p i n t r o , which is a dummy equal to one if the date
when the hazard map has been elaborated and delivered to the municipality; and c o mp l i a n c e
is a dummy equal to 1 if the mandatory building restriction date is binding. The dates are available
on a yearly basis.
27Only one transaction point is partially located in the red zone and thus is dropped.
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Figure 6a shows no clear indication whether the price level of the risky zones is significantly
below the no-hazard zones. Figure 6b illustrates the average number of houses sold per months
for the period 2007 – 2019 divided by hazard and non-hazard zone. We do not see graphical
evidence, which might suggest that houses sold after floods are so-called “fire-sales”.
4.4 Location-specific property attributes
Figure 5 and 6a show the raw data without controlling for potential confounding factors. The dif-
ference may capture the flood risk, but also other characteristics that are desirable characteristics
by themselves but likely correlated with the flood risk. Based on our geo–referenced data we can
calculate a rich set of control variables. Specifically, we control for location–specific amenities
such as the distance to water courses, the distance to recreational forests, the visible area, the
maximum distance of visibility towards the horizon, the distance to the center of Zurich, and the
average of yearly solar radiation.
The positive amenity of living near by the water can be highly correlated with risk location
(see Bin et al., 2008b, for a discussion).28 To obtain the measure distance to water, we compute
the Euclidean distance of each location to the next water polygon. Similarly, we capture distance
to recreational forests to capture the access to recreational areas.29
To control for the view, we compute the area that is visible from each location of the sold houses
(based on the centroid).30 From the mapped visible area for each location, we then extracted the
maximum distance to the horizon which is used as a control.31
We calculate the distance to the center of Zurich (central train station) by means of the shortest
path along the main road network, which we extract from the national terrain model of the Federal
Office for Topography (SWISSTOPO, 2018c). Moreover, we compute the solar radiation throughout
the year on the basis of the digital terrain model with a grid size of 25m (SWISSTOPO, 2018a)
28Daniel et al. (2009) argue furthermore that "previous studies often fail to adequately take into account the positive
effect of a location close to the water and that the literature would benefit from alternative methodologies that
better incorporate this confounding variable." One simple variable capturing the location of a risky floodplain may
underestimate the value of the risk of river flooding, as the positive and negative amenities of living close to the
water are not separately identified, and can partly cancel out in house prices”.
29This data set was extracted from the national topographic map at the scale of 1 : 25000 of (SWISSTOPO, 2018b).
30The neighboring houses are not considered in these calculations. The visibility was calculated on the basis of the
digital terrain model.
31Maximum distance to the horizon depends on the observers height. For an observer on the ground with eye level
at e.g. 1.70 m, the horizon is at a distance of 4.7 km. For an observer standing on a hill with 30 m in height, the
horizon is at a distance of 19.6 km.
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(a) House price development
(b) Number of houses sold
Figure 6: House price development by hazard zones. Notes: Figure 6a shows average house price
development from 2007 - 2019. Average house price development from 2007 - 2019. The green
line are the non-risky sqm prices and the red line are sqm house prices in hazard zones. The solid
lines are fitted using kernel-weighted local polynomial regression, using a Gaussian kernel, a
polynomial of degree two, and a bandwidth of seven quarters. Figure 6b shows monthly average
housing sales from 2007 - 2019 and the main flood events. The solid lines are nine months
moving averages and dots are observations.
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following the method and parameter sets suggested by (Zgraggen, 2001). More precisely speaking,
this is the potential solar radiation due to (absence of) shading by nearby mountains and hills,
but it does not include meteorological phenomena such as clouds or fog. The micro–topography
of the structure itself and shadowing by nearby houses have not been considered as we do not
have data about the exact shape and height of the buildings, only about the footprint.
Because the fiscal conditions are an important determinant of locational choice and thus
of housing prices (see, e.g., Schmidheiny, 2006), we match our data with municipality–specific
personal tax shifters provided by the Canton of Zurich Statistical Office (2020). These linear tax
shifters are determined locally and define the percentage of the (progressive) cantonal tax that
has to be paid to the municipality. Property prices may also be affected by neighborhood effects
that capture, for example, the presence of local public goods or the “quality” of neighbors (see,
e.g., Ioannides and Zabel, 2008). To control for these unobserved characteristics, we include
zip–code dummies in our regressions, as discussed in section 3.2. Detailed summary statistics of
of the used variables can be found in the Appendix A.2, see table A.2.
5 Results
We start by presenting the results from the “difference” regressions, followed by the DiD regres-
sions.
5.1 Differences in risk levels and hazard information
Table 2 presents the results for equation (7). Being located in a flood hazard zone has a significant
negative effect on housing prices (column 1), which confirms hypothesis H1. When separating
the effect of being in a low vs. medium hazard group (column 2), we find a significant effect for
the former, but not the latter, which is presumably due to the fact that the low-hazard category
contains many more properties than the medium–hazard category (see table A.2). The price
discount implies that the mandatory building insurance is in fact not complete, and that the risk
related to the uninsurable costs of flooding is reflected in house prices.
A past flood damage (i.e., the dummy indicating that an insurance claim exists before the
house was sold) has a significant and positive effect on housing prices. This may be due to the fact
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that by the time the house is sold, the damage has been repaired and better equipped as before,
such that the new buyer does suffer any costs from the damage. In fact, a house may be fully or
partially renovated in the wake of a flood damage, which increases the value. This could offset
the price discount of recently damaged houses. We could also show a table with 4 columns where
we show results with distance to water; however, hazard maps are than not significant...what do
you prefer?
Table 2: Baseline results
Dependent v.: Ln price sqm, real
(1) Hazard, 2 cat. (2) Hazard, 3 cat.
Hazard −0.013**
(0.006)
Low hazard −0.016**
(0.008)
Med. hazard 0.009
(0.015)
damage 0.019** 0.019**
(0.008) (0.008)
Ln (rooms) 0.348*** 0.347***
(0.010) (0.010)
Ln (size) −0.586*** −0.586***
(0.006) (0.006)
Ln (age) −0.155*** −0.155***
(0.008) (0.008)
Ln (distZH) −0.246*** −0.246***
(0.086) (0.086)
Ln (distforest) 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
Ln (radiation) 0.625*** 0.624***
(0.094) (0.094)
Ln (tax) 0.078** 0.078**
(0.038) (0.038)
Ln (vismaxdist) −0.002 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant 10.213*** 10.213***
(0.995) (0.996)
Weekday FE Ø Ø
Month FE Ø Ø
Year FE Ø Ø
Zip code FE Ø Ø
Observations 21, 765 21, 765
Notes: Results from estimating (7). The dependent is the log price per square
meter. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the municipality
level. We restrict the sample to sales for which a hazard map was available
at the transaction time. No hazard is in both specifications the ref. category.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
The effects of the structural and location–specific characteristics are mostly as expected. The
price of a house increases, ceteris paribus, if it is newer, has more bedrooms, has a wider view, is
exposed to more hours of sunshine and is located in a more urban area (and hence further away
from the forest). The price per m 2 decreases with the size of the house which is consistent with
the results by Lin and Evans (2000). The maximum distance of visibility from the center pixel of
the house (excluding the neighboring houses, in meters) has a negative but insignificant effect on
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housing prices.
In Zurich - the largest agglomeration in Switzerland - almost 774,000 people commute on an
average working day. The majority of them (535,284) are Zurich residents themselves who travel
to work in their own places of residence. In addition, there are over 166,000 people who commute
to work in Switzerland’s largest city (Wiget, 2017). It is not surprising that commuting distance to
Zurich negatively affect housing prices.
Municipality–specific tax rates have a significant positive effect. The positive tax effect can be
explained, if house buyers associate an increase in taxes with a corresponding increase in public
expenditure. If the marginal utility of public goods is higher than marginal utility of income, taxes
have a positive effect, see equation 5. This is consistent with Brülhart et al. (2017) who find that
higher-income households attach relatively more weight to publicly provided goods such that
they benefit more from an expenditure increase which is to some extent capitalized into (renting)
housing prices. Beat, du kennst die Schmidheiny Lit. etc. dazu besser, mehr? Besser erklï£¡ren (i.e.
dass wir vorallem die reichen HH haben die sich Haeuser kaufen?)
Hazard maps have not always been available. Table 3 shows how property prices were affected
by the introduction of flood hazard maps (mapintro) and their legal obligations (Compliance).
The introduction of hazard maps significantly increases the price of buildings outside the hazard
zone by almost 7%. Similarly, the binding legal guidelines associated with the hazard maps are
positive for non-risky houses. This is intuitive: Being officially cleared of flood risk is equivalent to
a decrease in risk, which increases the value of the property. This is partially in line with hypothesis
2.
In contrast, the effects of the introduction of hazard maps and the hazard map compliance on
low and medium hazard zones are negative but insignificant. We can think of two explanations
for this result. First, it is possible that the expected flood risk is most similar to the category “low
or medium hazard”, such that the assignment into this category in a new hazard map does not
lead to an updating of the risk assessment for these properties. In other words, although the
flood risk is priced into property prices (see table 2), the prices remain stable if the perceived
risk remains constant. Another explanation, which may hold instead or in addition to the above
argument, is based to the rules associated with the hazard assignment. Being assigned to low flood
protection measures in low hazard zones are voluntary, such that assignment to this category
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does not necessarily lead to an increase in costs. Although owning a house in medium flood
risk requires homeowners to implement flood protection measures, which are quite costly for
an existing structure, they might increase the value of the house at the same time such that the
net effect is zero. Overall, we conclude that the cantonal introduction of hazard maps is not
sufficiently capitalized into housing prices. Valid conclusion? What else?
Table 3: Introduction of hazard maps
Dependent v.: Ln price sqm, real
(1) Mapintro (2) Compl.
Low hazard 0.004 −0.017*
(0.042) (0.010)
Med. hazard 0.080 0.016
(0.073) (0.020)
Mapintro 0.066***
(0.022)
Low h. ×Mapintro −0.018
(0.043)
Med. h. ×Mapintro −0.071
(0.074)
Compliance 0.021***
(0.007)
Low h. × Compl. 0.007
(0.014)
Med. h. × Compl. −0.011
(0.031)
Constant 10.547*** 10.541***
(0.515) (0.514)
Controls Ø Ø
Weekday FE Ø Ø
Month FE Ø Ø
Year FE Ø Ø
Zip code FE Ø Ø
Observations 22, 336 22, 336
Note: The table presents results from estimation equation (9), standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. Dependent
variable is the Ln price / sqm. Mapintro is the data once the hazard
maps were introduced but legal obligations were not binding and com-
pliance is the data when obligations were binding. We do not control
for distance for water due to collinarity with the hazard zone variable.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
5.2 Difference-in-difference regressions
The estimates in table 2 – 3 may suffer from omitted variable bias if unobserved house price
determinants are correlated with the flood zone assignment. The trust we place in this estimator
depends on the extent to which we can control for the most important determinants of house
prices. To relax the assumption of being able to control for all relevant house price determinants,
we carry out two sets of DiD regressions.
Figure 7 visualizes the DiD event study results for estimating equation (9) following the previ-
ous literature using hazard zone location as the treatment group. The time window -30 - 0 days
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before the flood serves as the reference category in figure 7. Table A.4 in Appendix A.4 provides
the results DiD event study results. Although the pattern of the coefficients suggests that prices
(a) House prices, hazard vs.
non-hazard zone, 2 cat.
(b) House prices, Low hazard vs.
non-hazard zone, 3 cat.
(c) House prices, Med. hazard
vs. non-hazard zone, 3 cat.
Figure 7: Flood Effects 2007 - 2019, hazard zones. Notes: The figures plot event time coefficients
from estimation of equation 9 with hazard zones (one, low, medium) as the treatment group on
the 2007-2019 house price panel. Each point illustrates the average effect after e.g. 1–2 months
(=2 on the x-axis). The bars show the 95 percent confidence interval. The vertical axis measures
ln house prices. The reference category is the time window of -1 - 0 months before the flood.
Endpoints are binned.
decrease slightly after floods, the effects are not significant and we conclude that there is no effect.
A variety of studies are based on the information contained in the flood hazard maps, which
is an ex-ante measure of risk. Price discounts in the aftermath of floods have been previously
identified, but according to Atreya and Ferreira (2015) this was largely driven by an inundation
effect or a damage effect rather than an information effect. Using our insurance data that contains
information about actual damages, we address this issue in our first DiD estimation. Controlling
for actually damaged properties, we can isolate the information effect from damages and we do
find no effect.
Only a small share of the properties in a hazard zone are usually affected by a flood, and
damages also occur in zones designated as having no flood hazard.32 In this sense, the hazard
information from the official maps is an imprecise estimate of actual damages. The problem
of imprecise measurement using hazard maps can further be interpreted as a measurement
error: Hazard maps over–estimate the flood risk for non-affected properties in the hazard zone
and under–estimated it for affected properties in the zero-hazard zone. The latter is also a clear
violation of SUTVA, as the treatment also affects the control group. Addressing this issue, we can
cleanly identify treated and non–treated units by focusing on Near-misses in our second DiD
specification.
32In our sample, 3,375 claims occurred in non-hazard zones and only 207 in hazard zones.
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Figure 8 plots the event study point estimates of the DiD coefficients for house prices with -30
- 0 days as the reference category. The DiD effect on house prices in the months before a flood
is statistically not different from 0, which serves as a kind of placebo test. There is a significant
decrease in house prices between zero and one month after the flood time stamp. Afterwards, the
effect declines and becomes statistically insignificant. Recall that our data contain the date when
Figure 8: Near–misses (400m) vs. non Near–misses. Notes: The figure plots event time
coefficients from estimation of equation 9 with Near–misses as the treatment group on the
2007–2019 house price panel. We use the eleven biggest floods occurring between 2007–2019.
Each point illustrates the average effect after e.g. 1–2 months (=2 on the x-axis). The bars show
the 95 percent confidence interval. The vertical axis measures ln house prices. The reference
category is the time window of -1 - 0 months before the flood. Endpoints are binned.
the property actually changes ownership. Often, the selling price is agreed upon several weeks
before this date, with the interim phase used to secure financing, drawing up the paperwork
etc. If this phase takes around one months, then the peak at mi s s × f l o o d +1 can be considered
consistent with an immediate effect of a flood event on the contract price.
The definition of Near–misses is somewhat arbitrary, and buyers may disagree about what
constitutes a close call in terms of a narrowly missed flood damage. To learn more about the
sensitivity of our results to the specification of the Near-miss dummy, we estimate equation (9) for
Near–misses computed using distance thresholds between 400–600 m. Table 4 provides the results
obtained from estimating equation (9) using < 400m , < 500m and < 600m radius Near–misses
as the treatment group and non–Near–misses (i.e. houses which are not damaged and further
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Table 4: Event study based on Near-misses
Dependent v.: Ln price sqm, real
(1) NM300 (2) NM400 (3) NM500
miss300m × flood+1 −0.035**
(0.014)
miss300m × flood+2 0.017
(0.018)
miss300m × flood+3 −0.019
(0.019)
miss300m × flood+4 0.004
(0.016)
miss400m × flood+1 −0.038***
(0.013)
miss400m × flood+2 0.016
(0.015)
miss400m × flood+3 −0.011
(0.021)
miss400m × flood+4 −0.010
(0.014)
miss500m × flood+1 −0.025*
(0.014)
miss500m × flood+2 0.014
(0.012)
miss500m × flood+3 −0.007
(0.014)
miss500m × flood+4 −0.002
(0.014)
Constant 9.556*** 9.187*** 9.693***
(1.505) (1.676) (1.889)
Weekday FE Ø Ø Ø
Month FE Ø Ø Ø
Zip code × year FE Ø Ø Ø
Controls Ø Ø Ø
Observations 18, 701 19, 290 19, 707
Note: Dependent variable is the Ln sqm. price. Results for a coefficient from estimation equation
(9), standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. The reference are the
months -3 - 0 before and > 5 months after the flood. In each specification, we use a buffer exclud-
ing a radius of 300m. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
away, excluding a buffer of 300 m radius) as the control group. The reference are all other months
which are not explicitly shown. Likewise, there is a significant negative effect after one month in
all specifications, table 4 column 1 - 3.
Our findings are consistent with Beltrán et al. (2018a), who show that near–missed inland
properties (in terms of being located close to an inundated zone) experience a discount in the
immediate aftermath of inland flooding. Because we exclude damages, we can interpret the
negative discount on housing value as an information effect. After a damage occurs, prospective
buyers of a neighboring property will see the flood damage when inspecting the house they wish
to buy. Because the hazard zones are very imprecise, knowing that a nearby property was damaged
presumably leads to an update of the risk assessment, beyond the mean zonal risk (which is very
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low as most houses are never damaged, even within hazard zones). Buyers might learn that the
property of interest is located at a risky place. In line with Tinsley et al. (2012) who study Hurricane
experience in the US, we learn that Near-misses might actually suggest vulnerability to a potential
negative outcome.
To strengthen our conclusion that home buyers consider the near–missed houses as being at
danger, we further calculate whether the evaluation of a Near-miss is evaluated above (“higher
Near-miss”) or below/equal (“Lower Near-miss”) relative to the damaged property. One would
expected that houses located above damaged properties are considered to be safer and houses at
an evaluation below to be perceived as riskier. Table 5 provides the results for 500m Near-misses.33
Column (1) shows the results for lower/ and equally evaluated Near-misses and column (2) for
higher Near-misses. These results support the idea that a possible or negative feeling of security
does indeed depend on the evaluation of the house. There is a significant negative effect for lower
/ equally evaluated near-miss but in contrast, we see a significant and positive effect after one to
two months after a flood for higher near-misses compared to lower near-misses.
Table 5: Higher / lower Near-miss DiD results
Dependent v.: Ln price sqm, real
(1) NM500, lower (2) NM500, higher
Lower miss500m × flood+1 −0.023
(0.025)
Lower miss500m × flood+2 −0.002
(0.022)
Lower miss500m × flood+3 −0.034*
(0.019)
Lower miss500m × flood+4 −0.014
(0.023)
Higher miss500m × flood+1 −0.023
(0.017)
Higher miss500m × flood+2 0.028**
(0.013)
Higher miss500m × flood+3 0.019
(0.014)
Higher miss500m × flood+4 0.010
(0.017)
Constant 9.708*** 9.669***
(1.877) (1.882)
Weekday FE Ø Ø
Month FE Ø Ø
Zip code × year FE Ø Ø
Controls Ø Ø
Observations 19, 707 19, 707
Note: Dependent variable is the Ln sqm. price. Results for a coefficient from estimation equa-
tion (9) where we seperate higher and lower /equal evaluation near–misses. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. The reference are the months -3 - 0 be-
fore and > 5 months after the flood. In each specification, we use a buffer excluding a radius
of 300m. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
33We use the 500 m Near-miss radius to increase sample size for higher and lower Near-misses.
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There is a certain inaccuracy in our specifications as to when a flood effect is reflected in the
data. This inaccuracy can be explained by the fact that there is not an exact time span between
price determination and the notary appointment (i.e. our transaction date). Depending on the
buyer and seller, it may well be that a financially strong buyer only needs a month, whereas
another buyer needs more time to organize financing. TBD if we should actually show this.....
500m specificatin is the only radius where we see an effect.
However, it turns out that the overall effect is very short (between one (table 4) and three
months after the flood (table 5)). One could argue that or findings support the presence of an
availability bias. But potentially, owners will organize and carry out repairs, paid for by the building
insurance. Once these repairs are completed, prospective buyers have no way of knowing that
there was a flood damage nearby, unless the buyer explicitly informs them about this. However,
they have little incentives to do so. In this sense, our results do not necessarily require a deviation
from rationality as in the availability bias literature, but they could simply be driven by the
temporal visibility of the signal.
5.3 Robustness checks
To learn more about the sensitivity of our results to the specification of the near-miss dummy, we
further provide additional estimates for equation (9) for Near–misses computed using distance
thresholds between 700–1000 m.34 Figure 9 illustrates the event study results. There seems to
be a negative effect one month after the flood, but the effects are not significant. It can thus be
suggested that it depends very much on how close you are to a damaged house. The further away,
the more likely one will no longer find any effect.
In our main DiD specifications, we include 12 months fixed effects but not months-year fixed
effects as there would be an overlap with our event study coefficients. One could argue, that
our results could thus be bias by year-specific trends. Thus, we further provide estimates with
month-of-year fixed effects. What is crucial for the identification of the flood effect in conjunction
with month–of–year fixed effects is that the floods did not occur on the first day of a a calendar
month, such that they are not absorbed by the month–year dummies, see figure 3. Table A.5
presents the results, which are robust.
34Sample size below 300 m is to low.
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Figure 9: Flood effect 2007 – 2019 for different Near-miss groups. Notes: The figure plots event
time coefficients from estimation of equation 9 with different near–misses as the treatment
group (700–1000m) on the 2007–2019 house price panel. Each color represents coefficients of a
separate estimation and each point illustrates the average effect after e.g. 1–2 months (=2 on the
x-axis). The bars show the 95 percent confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. The vertical axis measures ln house prices. The reference category is the time
window of -1 - 0 months before the flood. Endpoints are binned.
One important referendum related to housing value took place in September 2014. There
was a cantonal referendum on the submission of a new planning and building law. Residents
had to decide whether there should be a minimum share of reasonably priced housing.35 The
referendum was accepted and municipalities should reserved a minimum proportion of specified
building zones for low-cost apartments. We include a dummy, which is one if the transaction took
place after the referendum. Table A.6 presents the results. The referendum has a significant and
negative effect on house prices, see table A.6. The main DiD estimation results do not change.
Anything else? FYI: I decided to show the NM 300 - 500 specification results in the main result
section as this is even more convincing...I could also rearrange it....what do you prefer?
35The submission template "Determination of minimum share of affordable housing" is intended to expand the
scope of action of municipalities in promoting low-cost housing construction and to create the necessary legal
basis. An amendment to the planning and construction act is intended to allow municipalities to impose low-cost
housing units in a given area, while at the same time improving their structural potential (Canton of Zurich, 2014b).
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6 Concluding remarks
Negative effects on housing prices in the aftermath of disastrous hurricanes and floods in the US
are well established. Mandatory insurance for the most risky flood zones can explain a negative
effect on its own. However, less is known about a setting where socialized building insurance
exist. In addition, most of the existing studies use floodplain maps only as a flood risk measure,
suffering from problems, which should not be ignored. Our study utilizes both, flood maps as
well as insurance claims to determine the effect of the floods between 2007–2019 in the canton of
Zurich, Switzerland using not only hazard zones as a treatment but also Near–misses. This allows
us to identify very clearly whether a potential effect of floods on housing value is to informational
updating or due to actual damages.
To summarize, the first difference results of being located in a hazard zone is negative and
significant. Houses located in hazard zones sell at a discount relative to houses without flood
risk (H1). Although there is social insurance, we see that the uninsurable costs of flooding are
reflected in house prices
Exploring the influence of public information on designated hazard zones, reveals that the
effect on house prices varies with the degree of risk. When home owners learn, that they are
located in a “safe” zone, we find a positive and significant effect (H2). Being located in hazard
zone in turn does not seem to have any effect. Potentially, the cantonal introduction of hazard
maps is not sufficiently capitalized into housing prices.
Results for our first DiD specification using hazard maps as the treatment category violates
SUTVA, as only some actually damaged houses are located in hazard zones and we do not find an
effect in the aftermath of a flood. A more accurate strategy to assess the information effect of floods
is to calculate Near–misses, i.e., housing properties closely located to actual damages (but not
damaged themselves). In this DiD specifications, there is a drop shortly after a flood has occurred,
suggesting that there is evidence for informational updating (H3). We find that immediately after
the flood, near–missed housing values are sold for substantially less than equivalent properties
further away. Include here higher lower near-miss results?
The cantonal government of Zurich government decided in 2017 to implement a new project
against extreme flooding of the river Sihl, which is expected to cost around 130 million CHF and
would be completed in 2023 at the earliest (Amt fuer Abfall, Wasser, Energie und Luft, 2017). The
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estimates of our study provide valuable information necessary in the context of cost–benefit
analyses of public investments in flood protection measures or of mandatory insurance schemes,
in which the price depends on risk. Clearly, people need information about flood risk to be
consider in their locational choice. Existing hazard maps are a first step, but they are not sufficient.
We learn that people are somewhat rational as flood risk is priced into housing, despite socialized
insurance. However, the effect is only temporary Are they fully rational as only when they see
something, it is priced in? TBD how to write it. Further additional measures are required such as
regular reminders, or some other mechanism triggering memory.
Our results are partially in line with the literature (Bin and Landry, 2013; Atreya et al., 2013b;
Gallagher, 2014). However, the time horizon of studied events as well as the setting is very different.
“Forgetting” related to house prices of large scale events in the US, i.e., hurricanes and related
floods, takes from six (Bin and Landry, 2013) to eight years (Atreya et al., 2013b) and up to nine
years if the outcome of interest is insurance take up (Gallagher, 2014). The setting in the canton of
Zurich is quite different. There exists social insurance and the floods are very unlike compared to
the US flood events in terms of caused damage. There remains work to be done assessing detailed
geological characteristics of river floods and the link to housing and land prices. What is the
critical threshold in terms of damages, such that a flood is of consequence for real estate prices?
In addition, “forgetting” of past flood events is rather fast, compared to tremendous hurricanes
in the US. It would be a fruitful task for future research to investigate whether social building
insurance alone can explain this fast and persistent “forgetting” TBD.
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Appendix
A.1 Literature review
The following table provides a review of the previous literature. It provides the year of publication,
the place and sample period, the main methods used, the dependent variable, the proxy for flood
risk and the role of insurance. The column “Effect” describes the main effect shown in the paper,
or lack thereof if not statistically significant.
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Author Year Country Location Method used Dependent
variable
Flood risk Insurance Effect Time in
years
Specific
flood?
Barnard (1978) 1978 US Ralston Creek Standard hedonic
price model
Housing
prices
100-year floodplains NA urban expansion has in-
creased the runoff and flood
hazard in the Ralston Creek
watershed
1973 No
MacDonald et al. (1987) 1987 US Monroe,Louisiana Theoretical model
and hedonic price
regression
Housing
prices
Probability of flood-
ing determined
using the different
levels from the Flood
Insurance Rate Maps
Flood insurance
premiums re-
flect flood risk of
the area because
they are based
on elevation
negative effect 1985 No
Skantz and Strickland (1987) 1987 US Texas Standard hedonic
price model
and DiD
Housing
prices
100-year floodplains NFIP flood insur-
ance
Increase in flood insurance
rate one year after the flood
1977 - 1981 Yes, 1979
Donnelly (1989) 1989 US WI Standard hedonic
price model
Housing
sales dataă
100 year floodplain NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect 1983 - 1985 No
Shilling et al. (1989) 1989 US Lousiana Standard hedonic
price model
Housing
prices
100 year floodplain NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect 1982 - 1984 No
Bialaszewski and Newsome
(1990)
1990 US Homewood, Al-
abamaăand
Monroe,
Louisiana
Standard hedonic
price model
Housing
prices
100-year floodplains NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect for Monroe 1987 - 1989 No
Holway and Burby (1990) 1990
MacDonald et al. (1990) 1990 US Monroe,
Louisiana
Standard hedonic
price model
Housing
prices
100 year floodplain NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect 1988 No
Speyrer and Ragas (1991) 1991 US New Orleans,
Louisiana
Linear and semi-
logarithmic regres-
sions
Selling
prices
100-year floodplain NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect 1971-1986 1978, 1980,
and 1983
Bartosova et al. (2000) 1999 US WI Standard hedonic
price model
Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect 1995 - 1998 Flood in
1997
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Fridgen et al. (1999) 1999 US ND,MI Standard hedonic
price model
Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect for 100 year
flood plains
1995-1998 Flood 1997
Harrison et al. (2001) 2001 US Alachua County,
Florida
Hedonic pricing
techniques
Housing
prices
100-year floodplain NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect 1980Ű1997 No
Shultz and Fridgen (2001) 2001 US Fargo Moorhead Standard hedonic
price model
Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
flood insurance premiums
were determined to account
for approximately 81 percent
of price depreciation
1995 - 1998 No
Dei-Tutu and Bin (2002) 2002 US NC Standard hedonic
price model
Housing
prices
100-year floodplain NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect 1998 - 2002 Flood in
1999
Eves (2002) 2002 Australia Sydney Standard hedonic
price model
Housing
prices
100-year floodplain No insurance negative effect 1994 - 2000 Flood 1990
Zhai et al. (2003) 2003 Japan Tokai region cross-sectional anal-
ysis, and hedonic ap-
proach based panel
analysis
Land prices actual damaged
houses
land prices in flood-prone ar-
eas are lower and
have less variance than in
other areas
2000 Tokai
flood in
Japan
Bin and Polasky (2004) 2004 US North Carolina Standard hedonic
price model, DiD
Housing
prices
100 year floodplain NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect , bigger effect
directly after the flood
1992 - 2002 Flood in
1999, after
Hurricane
Floyd
Bin (2004) 2004 US North Carolina Hedonic price
model, Semi-
parametric regres-
sion
Housing
prices
100-year floodplains NFIP flood insur-
ance
2000 - 2002 No
Troy and Romm (2004) 2004 US California DiD
spatial hedonic
model
Housing
prices
floodplain disclosure
under
AB 1195
negative effect 1996 - 2000 floodplain
disclosure
under
AB 1195
Hallstrom and Smith (2005) 2005 US FL DiD
spatial hedonic
model
Housing
prices
100-year floodplains NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect 21 years, Hurrican
Andrew
1992
Bin and Kruse (2006) 2006 US North Carolina Standard hedonic
price model
Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect 2002 - 2004 No
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Lamond and Proverbs (2006) 2006 England Barlby, North
Yorkshire
Semi-logarithmic re-
gression
Housing
prices
UK flood maps,
Flood dummy
voluntary insur-
ance
no significant long-term
impact on prices of property
in the floodplain, in the short
term prices increased less
than in the rest of the market
2000-2005 Floods in
2000 and
2001
Baade et al. (2007) 2007 US Miami, New Or-
leans
MLE Taxable
sales
not relevant not relevant short-term positive effect on
the Miami economy
1987 Ű 2004 Hurricane
Andrew,
Hurricane
Katrina,
Rodney
King riots
Lamond et al. (2007) 2007 England Bewdley,
Worcestershire
Repeated sales
model
Housing
prices
Before and after 2000
floods
voluntary insur-
ance
Prices are discounted 7
Daniel et al. (2007) 2007 Netherlandsnear Meuse river Standard hedonic
price model, DiD
Housing
prices
Transition plains N/A local housing markets in the
Netherlands are
sensitive to flood risk
1990 - 2004 Floods of
Meuse river
Morgan (2007) 2007 US Florida Standard hedonic
price model
Housing
prices
100-year floodplains NFIP flood insur-
ance
positive effect, flood event ad-
justs the market downward
2000-2006 Hurricane
Ivan
Bin et al. (2008a) 2008 US North Carolina Standard hedonic
price model, spa-
tial autoregressive
model
Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect 2000-2004 No
Bin et al. (2008b) 2008 US North Carolina Spatial autoregres-
sive hedonic model
Housing
prices
100 year floodplain NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect 1996 - 2002 No
Burningham et al. (2008) 2008 England Logistic regression
analysis of the fac-
tors predicting the
likelihood of aware-
ness of flood risk
Respondents
awareness
that prop-
erty was in
a flood risk
area
Social class has the most in-
fluence on predicting aware-
ness of flood risk, followed
by flood experience and then
length of time in residence
- Severe flood
events in
1998 and
2000
Pope (2008) 2008 US North Carolina Standard hedonic
price model, DiD
Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect, buyer and
seller are differently informed
1995 - 1996 No
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Daniel et al. (2009) 2009 US Meta-study Housing
prices
different specifica-
tions
NFIP flood insur-
ance
overall negative effect
Daniel et al. (2009) 2009 US whole US Meta-study Housing
price esti-
mates
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect, avaerage
price of an otherwise similar
house of Ű0.6%.
1990 - 2004 No, several
flood events
Kousky (2010) 2010 US Missouri Standard hedonic
price model, DiD
Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
1979 - 2006 1993 flood
on the Mis-
souri and
Mississippi
rivers
Lamond et al. (2010) 2010 England Variation of the
repeat sales index
model
Housing
prices
Four risk classes
significant (S), mod-
erate
(M), low (L) and out-
side the floodplain
(O)
In the UK, flood
risk has been
included as stan-
dard within the
general domes-
tic all risks
insurance policy
since the late
1960s. How-
ever, different
revisions to the
principles after
2000 allow for
removal of cover
from high risk
properties and
pricint to risk.
Flood impacts on property
prices are small and tempo-
rary
2000-2006 Flood
events of
autumn
2000
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McKenzie and Levendis (2010) 2010 US New Orleans Hedonic price regres-
sion, flooded vs non-
flooded subset, pre-
vs post- Katrina
Housing
prices
Elevation (in foots)
value in flood-
prone areas and
areas not subject to
flooding, pre- and
post-Katrina.
No information
found (see SAB
comment)
positive effect of elevation ,
which increased from 1.4% to
4.6% for flooded areas after
Katrina.
2.5, Jan-
uary 2004-
August 2006
Hurricane
Katrina
Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2010) 2010 US Florida OLS regression Demand
for flood
insurance
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
Analysis of flood insurance
market
2000 - 2005 No
Posey and Rogers (2010) 2010 US Missouri Standard hedo-
nic price model,
correction for au-
toregressive errors
Housing
prices
100-year floodplains NFIP flood insur-
ance
located in a flood zone re-
duces the value of a property
by about 8.6%, including both
direct and indirect effects
2000 No
Samarasinghe and Sharp (2010) 2010 New
Zealand
North Shore City Spatial autoregres-
sive hedonic model
Housing
prices
100-year floodplains No mandatory
insurance
Pryce et al. (2011) 2011 Theoretical model
Atreya and Ferreira (2012) 2012 US Georgia DiD Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains,
actual inundated
area
NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect, more pro-
nounced by affected areas
1985 -Ű2010 1994 flood
in Albany
Atreya et al. (2013a) 2012 US Georgia DiD Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
Negative, short lived effect 1985 - 2010 1994
Atreya et al. (2013b) 2013 US Dougherty
County, Georgia
DiD Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
negative effect (significant for
the 100y FP)
1985 - 2004 1994 Şflood
of the centu-
ryŤ
Atreya et al. (2013b) 2013 US Georgia DiD Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
significant increase in the dis-
count for properties in the
100-year floodplain immedi-
ately after the flood.
1985 - 2004 1994, the
Flint River
overran
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Bin and Landry (2013) 2013 US Pitt County,
North Carolina
DiD Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
Negative effect, Change in
risk valuation after significant
flooding events found.
1992 - 2008 Hurricanes
Fran 1996
and Floyd
1999
Bin and Landry (2013) 2013 US Pitt County,
NorthCarolina
DiD Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
Prior to Hurricane Fran, we
detect no market risk pre-
mium for presence in a flood
zone, but we find significant
price differentials after signif-
icant flooding events
1992 - 2008 Hurricane
Fran and
Hurricane
Floyd
Petrolia et al. (2013) 2013 US U.S. Gulf Coast
and Floridas At-
lantic Coast
Experimental survey Flood in-
surance
purchase
decisions
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
risk aversion over the loss do-
main, perceived expectations
of hurricane damage,
eligibility for disaster assis-
tance, and credibility of
insurance providers pos-
itively and significantly
correlates
with the decision to purchase
a flood policy
Rambaldi et al. (2013) 2013 Australia Brisbane Standard hedonic
price model
Housing
prices
100 year floodplain residences are
able to obtain
commercially
available flood
insurance
property-price discounting of
5.5 percent per metre below
the defined flood level
Small et al. (2013) 2013 Australia Rockhampton Mail survey of flood-
affected properties
and comparison to
market
Descriptive
analysis
N/A larger negative discount is
not supported in the data
2011 Rock-
hampton
floods
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Turnbull et al. (2013) 2013 US Louisiana, Ba-
ton Rouge
metropolitan
area
search model to
the flood hazard
situation; system es-
timation framework
Housing
price and
liquidity
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
flood risks are capitalized into
both house price
and liquidity
1984 - 2005
Gallagher (2014) 2014 US Entire country Event study frame-
work
insurance
policies per
capita
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
insurance take-up spikes the
year after a flood and then
steadily declines to baseline
1990Ű2007 Several
floods
Husby et al. (2014) 2014 Netherlands Dynamic DiD Population
growth
Areas affected by the
1953 flood
Long-term effects on pop-
ulation growth were most
likely not directly related to
the flood in 1953, the positive
long-term effects found were
instead due to the policy
interventions following the
flood
1947-2000 Great North
Sea Flood
of 1953
and the
construc-
tion of the
Deltaworks
Atreya and Ferreira (2015) 2015 US DiD Housing
prices
the flood inundation
map, 100-year and
500-year floodplains
the price discount for prop-
erties in the inundated area
is substantially larger than in
comparable properties in the
floodplain
Hill (2015) 2015 US New York DiD Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains,
newly assigned flood
zones
NFIP flood insur-
ance
sale price of a property newly
placed in any flood zone after
2015 decreases by 8.6 percent
on average
2003 - 2015 Hurricane
Sandy 2012
Belanger and Bourdeau-Brien
(2018)
2016 England whole UK Linear mixed effects
model / hierachical
model
Housing
prices
UK flood maps,
Flood dummy
Insure price
insurance poli-
cies according
to individual
property flood
risk
negative effect 1995 - 2015 No
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Meldrum (2016) 2016 US Boulder County,
Colorado
Hedonic price
estimation and
non-parametric
matching estimation
Housing
prices
NFIP flood insur-
ance
strong price effect associated
with floodplain-designation
for condominiums
but no price differential for
standalone properties
1995 - 2012 No
Bakkensen and Barrage (2017) 2017 US North Carolina,
Rhode Island
Door-to-door survey
campaign and theo-
retical model
Fl?ood risk
perceptions
not relevant NFIP flood insur-
ance
selection into coastal homes
is driven by both lower risk
perceptions and higher
coastal amenity values
2016 No
Beltrán et al. (2018b) 2018 Meta-study, 37 stud-
ies and 349 point es-
timates
Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
price discount lies anywhere
between -75.5 to a +61.0
Atreya and Czajkowski (2019) 2019 US Galveston
County, TX
Standard hedonic
model, FE model
Housing
prices
100-year and 500-
year floodplains
NFIP flood insur-
ance
hedonic price premium is de-
pendent upon the distance to
the coast
2001 - 2010 No
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A.2 Descriptives
Table A.2: Summary Statistics
Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Ln (Price) 7.617 0.814 −0 11
damage 0.054 0.225 0 1
Ln (rooms) 1.629 0.243 0 4
Ln (size) 6.357 0.789 3 13
Ln (age) 3.754 1.020 0 7
Ln (distwater) 5.199 0.923 −1 7
Ln (distZH) 9.684 0.645 6 11
Ln (distforest) 5.209 0.898 −0 8
Ln (radiation) 4.912 0.034 5 5
Ln (tax) 4.659 0.140 4 5
Ln (vismaxdist) 11.079 0.778 7 12
Unkown zone 0.000 0.020 0 1
Single familiy 0.589 0.492 0 1
Business 0.003 0.054 0 1
Mixed 0.258 0.437 0 1
Munic. district 0.000 0.019 0 1
Wood 0.001 0.024 0 1
Farming 0.033 0.179 0 1
Reserve 0.001 0.038 0 1
Public 0.000 0.017 0 1
No–building zone 0.002 0.045 0 1
Multiple familiy zone 0.112 0.315 0 1
miss500m 0.341 0.474 0 1
miss600m 0.395 0.489 0 1
miss700m 0.444 0.497 0 1
Lower miss500m 0.161 0.368 0 1
Lower miss600m 0.186 0.389 0 1
Lower miss700m 0.206 0.405 0 1
Higher miss500m 0.180 0.384 0 1
Higher miss600m 0.210 0.407 0 1
Higher miss700m 0.238 0.426 0 1
Buffer 500 - 1000m 0.220 0.415 0 1
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Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Buffer 600 - 1000m 0.166 0.372 0 1
Buffer 700 - 1000m 0.117 0.321 0 1
flood+1 0.070 0.255 0 1
flood+2 0.065 0.246 0 1
flood+3 0.069 0.254 0 1
flood+4 0.064 0.245 0 1
flood+5 0.063 0.244 0 1
flood+6 0.063 0.244 0 1
flood+7 0.057 0.232 0 1
flood+8 0.058 0.234 0 1
flood+9 0.916 0.278 0 1
flood−0 0.066 0.248 0 1
flood−1 0.062 0.241 0 1
flood−2 0.064 0.245 0 1
flood−3 0.061 0.240 0 1
Hazard 0.111 0.314 0 1
Hazard low 0.093 0.291 0 1
Hazard medium 0.017 0.131 0 1
mapintro 0.930 0.255 0 1
mandatory 0.523 0.499 0 1
weekday 3.145 1.462 0 6
Month 6.716 3.373 1 12
Zip codes 135.969 74.623 1 256
Year 2012.926 3.771 2007 2019
Total observations 36118
A.3 GVZ insurance
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Table A.3: GVZ claim statistic on a yearly base
Year Annual number of building damage Annual building damage [CHF] Average amount of damage per claim [CHF]
2006 132 954,323.0 7,230.0
2007 576 6,050,587.0 10,504.0
2008 368 3,903,027.0 10,606.0
2009 274 1,780,504.0 6,498.0
2010 215 1,946,096.0 9,052.0
2011 382 3,661,002.0 9,584.0
2012 297 2,397,430.0 8,072.0
2013 498 5,814,337.0 11,675.0
2014 335 3,756,345.0 11,213.0
2015 505 6,560,613.0 12,991.0
2016 233 1,966,285.0 8,439.0
Notes: The table show the aggregated values of GVZ insurance claims per year 2006 – 2017. Only
flood damage with the status "completed", "pending" or "reactivated" were taken into account.
The damage amounts include the deductible (i.e. the so-called gross damage).
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A.4 Additional Results
Table A.4: Near-miss DiD results
Dependent v.: Ln price sqm, real
(1) Hazard, 2 cat. (2) Low Hazard, 3 cat. (3) Med. Hazard, 3 cat.
hazard × flood+1 −0.015
(0.037)
hazard × flood+2 −0.016
(0.025)
hazard × flood+3 −0.033
(0.023)
hazard × flood+4 −0.029
(0.018)
hazard=2 × flood+1 −0.009
(0.042)
hazard=2 × flood+2 −0.032
(0.026)
hazard=2 × flood+3 −0.040
(0.029)
hazard=2 × flood+4 −0.037
(0.024)
hazard=3 × flood+1 −0.074
(0.050)
hazard=3 × flood+2 0.066
(0.051)
hazard=3 × flood+3 −0.007
(0.046)
hazard=3 × flood+4 −0.002
(0.054)
Constant 9.874*** 9.885*** 9.847***
(1.566) (1.591) (1.582)
Weekday FE Ø Ø Ø
Month FE Ø Ø Ø
Zip code × year FE Ø Ø Ø
Controls Ø Ø Ø
Observations 21, 514 21, 514 21, 514
Notes: Dependent variable is the Ln sqm. price. Results from estimation equation (7), standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the municipality level. We restrict the sample to sales, where the hazard map was already availble at the
transaction time. Column (1) shows results using two hazard categories (hazard and non–hazard) and column (2) and (3)
print results using three categories (low and medium). No hazard is in all specifications the ref. category and the time
reference are the months -3 - 0 before and > 5 months after the flood. We do not control for distance for water due to
collinarity with the hazard zone variable. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
A.5 Robustness results
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Table A.5: Robustness Near-miss DiD results incl. month-of-year FE
Dependent v.: Ln price sqm, real
(1) NM300, all (2) NM400, all (3) NM500, lower (4) NM500, higher
miss300m × flood+1 −0.036**
(0.014)
miss300m × flood+2 0.014
(0.020)
miss300m × flood+3 −0.034*
(0.019)
miss300m × flood+4 0.001
(0.017)
miss400m × flood+1 −0.043***
(0.014)
miss400m × flood+2 0.010
(0.013)
miss400m × flood+3 −0.025
(0.020)
miss400m × flood+4 −0.014
(0.014)
Lower miss500m × flood+1 −0.018
(0.024)
Lower miss500m × flood+2 −0.007
(0.021)
Lower miss500m × flood+3 −0.044***
(0.016)
Lower miss500m × flood+4 −0.014
(0.022)
Higher miss500m × flood+1 −0.020
(0.020)
Higher miss500m × flood+2 0.029**
(0.014)
Higher miss500m × flood+3 0.013
(0.014)
Higher miss500m × flood+4 0.009
(0.018)
Constant 9.675*** 9.286*** 9.869*** 9.825***
(1.574) (1.702) (1.898) (1.905)
Weekday FE Ø Ø Ø Ø
Month-Year FE Ø Ø Ø Ø
Zip code × year FE Ø Ø Ø Ø
Controls Ø Ø Ø Ø
Observations 18, 701 19, 290 19, 707 19, 707
Note: Dependent variable is the Ln sqm. price. Results for a coefficient from estimation equation (9) including month-
of-year FE, standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. The reference are the months -
3 - 0 before and > 5 months after the flood. In each specification, we use a buffer excluding a radius of 300m.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Table A.6: Robustness Near-miss DiD results incl. referedum
Dependent v.: Ln price sqm, real
(1) NM300, all (2) NM400, all (3) NM500, lower (4) NM500, higher
After 14 refer. −0.054*** −0.039*** −0.053*** −0.055***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
miss300m × flood+1 −0.036**
(0.014)
miss300m × flood+2 0.014
(0.020)
miss300m × flood+3 −0.033*
(0.019)
miss300m × flood+4 0.001
(0.017)
miss400m × flood+1 −0.043***
(0.014)
miss400m × flood+2 0.010
(0.013)
miss400m × flood+3 −0.024
(0.020)
miss400m × flood+4 −0.014
(0.014)
Lower miss500m × flood+1 −0.018
(0.024)
Lower miss500m × flood+2 −0.008
(0.021)
Lower miss500m × flood+3 −0.044***
(0.016)
Lower miss500m × flood+4 −0.014
(0.022)
Higher miss500m × flood+1 −0.020
(0.020)
Higher miss500m × flood+2 0.029**
(0.014)
Higher miss500m × flood+3 0.014
(0.014)
Higher miss500m × flood+4 0.009
(0.018)
Constant 9.696*** 9.305*** 9.895*** 9.852***
(1.573) (1.702) (1.898) (1.906)
Weekday FE Ø Ø Ø Ø
Month-Year FE Ø Ø Ø Ø
Zip code × year FE Ø Ø Ø Ø
Controls Ø Ø Ø Ø
Observations 18, 701 19, 290 19, 707 19, 707
Note: Dependent variable is the Ln sqm. price. Results for a coefficient from estimation equation (9), standard errors in paren-
theses are clustered at the municipality level. We include a variable controlling for the 2014 referendum. The reference are
the months -3 - 0 before and > 5 months after the flood. In each specification, we use a buffer excluding a radius of 300m.
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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